1 This same system is also used offline, when subjects mentally rehearse potential actions for purposes of decision-making. In such cases a motor schema is activated, and although the instructions that would normally be sent to the muscles have been inhibited, the emulator system goes ahead and constructs a representation of the expected sensory consequences. This sensory representation can be 'globally broadcast' (in the sense of Baars, 1988 ) when attended to, thus being made available to a range of systems to draw inferences and evaluate the action. We return to these points later in the chapter.
Meta-level
Object-level We will assume, then, that those who propose metacognitive explanations for the behaviour of animals in uncertainty-monitoring experiments intend this in the standard sense: they are claiming that the animals metarepresent their own states of uncertainty, and modify their behaviour as a result. We will suggest, in contrast, that the data can equally well be explained in nonmetarepresentational terms. First, however, we propose to situate the issue within a wider debate about the evolutionary emergence of metarepresentational capacities.
The phylogeny of metarepresentation
Metacognition and mindreading (or 'theory of mind') are widely believed to overlap (at least) in their psychological bases and evolutionary histories. This is because both rely, fundamentally, on metarepresentation: the representation of mental states. In the case of mindreading, this involves attributing mental states to others, while in metacognition we attribute mental states to ourselves. When one attempts to explain the adaptive advantage that these capacities supplied to our ancestors, a notion of control is invoked in each case. Mindreading allows us to predict the behaviour of others in order to control our own (social) behaviour. Hence, mindreading is thought to have evolved to navigate an increasingly complex social world, engaging with multiple conspecifics in groups with complex social organization. Metacognition, in contrast, allows us to monitor and control object-level systems in our own mind, enabling us to learn and reason more flexibly.
Metarepresentation then features in both mindreading and metacognition, but in the service of rather different functions (social cognition versus cognitive control). This leads us to ask which function of metarepresentation is evolutionarily prior (as well as how this bears on the question of human cognitive architecture). The question of prioricity naturally suggests two kinds of account of the evolution of metarepresentational capacities. 2 According to one approach, the capacity to represent one's own mental states (or some subset thereof) evolved first ), presumably to enable animals to accrue the benefits of metacognitive monitoring and control. Once evolved, the conceptual and inferential resources involved were later exapted for attributing mental states to other agents. There are two main ways in which this could have happened, partly motivated by different views of human mindreading. Either these first-person resources were redeployed to form the basis of a distinct mindreading faculty of the sort defended by Nichols and Stich ( 2003 ) , or they were combined with emerging capacities for imaginative perspective-taking to enable simulations of the mental lives of others (Goldman 2006 ) . We will refer to these as 'first-person-based' accounts of the evolution of metarepresentation, while making no attempt to adjudicate between dual-mechanism and simulationist variants.
According to the alternative approach, a capacity to attribute mental states to other agents evolved first, driven by the exigencies of social living and resulting in an innately channelled mindreading faculty of some sort. But this mindreading-based account also admits of two main variants. According to one, a core capacity to make self-attributions would have been present from the start, since there would have been nothing to prevent subjects from turning their mindreading abilities on themselves, treating the self as an agent like any other. A disposition to attribute mental states to oneself on a regular basis would only have required the motivation to direct one's attention accordingly (Carruthers 2011 ) . According to the other variant of a mindreading-based account, in contrast, some sort of self-monitoring mechanism was subsequently added to the 2 We assume that no one should now think that these capacities result from general learning, and that everyone should agree that they are innately channelled in development to some significant degree. While these assumptions go undefended here, they are in fact supported by large and varied bodies of data. See Carruthers ( 2011 ) for further discussion. third-person mindreading system, enabling direct (non-sensory) access to one's own mental states (Frith and Happé ( 1999 ) seem to have in mind something like this). In this case we propose not to remain neutral between the two variants, but will work with a self-directed-mindreading account throughout. This provides the cleanest contrast with first-person-based approaches. And there is, in fact, a good deal of evidence against the monitoring-mechanism alternative (see Carruthers 2011 ). We will shortly compare the first-person-based and mindreading-based accounts of the evolution of metarepresentation with respect to the predictions that each makes regarding the comparative data. But first it is worth noting an apparent anomaly for the former. This is that it is widely agreed among psychologists that human metacognitive capacities (or at least those of an uncontroversially metarepresentational sort) are far from impressive. For example, one robust finding in the literature is that people's metacognitive judgements of learning are only moderately correlated, at best, with later recall (Leonesio and Nelson 1990 ; Dunlosky and Metcalfe 2009 ) , and another is that correlations between metacognitive judgements of text comprehension and tests of understanding are often close to zero (Lin and Zabrucky 1998 ; Maki and McGuire 2002 ) . Moreover, human metacognitive capacities are fragile and cue-based, are late to develop in childhood, and are heavily dependent upon individual differences in personality and local cultural mores for their effectiveness (Stanovich and West 2000 ; Koriat et al. 2006 Koriat et al. , 2008 Stanovich 2009 ).
These findings are not what might be expected if metacognitive abilities had a long evolutionary history and are innately channelled in development. In contrast, everyone agrees that human mindreading capacities are remarkably good (although admittedly we lack any shared metric for comparing mindreading capacities with metacognitive ones). More importantly, we now have ample evidence of their early emergence in human infancy (Southgate et al. 2007 (Southgate et al. , 2010 Surian et al. 2007 ; Buttelmann et al. 2009b ; Scott and Baillargeon 2009 ; Scott et al. 2010 ) . This is just as might be predicted by a mindreading-based account of the evolution of metarepresentational abilities.
It could be replied, of course, that biological structures need only deliver small adaptive advantages in order to be selected for, especially over a long time-frame. And it is possible that metarepresentational capacities evolved initially for first-person metacognitive uses, after which the main adaptive pressure became a social one. This would explain the seemingly poor metacognitive capacities of humans combined with excellent mindreading. One might expect, however, that if metacognitive capacities had been selected for among our ancestors, then they would have come under additional adaptive pressure (leading to further robustness and reliability) when learning and decision-making become increasingly complex through the evolution of the hominin line. In any case the contrast between human native capacities for metacognition, on the one hand, and mindreading, on the other, appears striking, and provides some indirect support for a mindreadingbased account of the evolution of metarepresentation.
Predictions for comparative psychology
If metarepresentational capacities evolved initially for metacognitive monitoring and control, then one might expect to find creatures capable of metacognition who are in capable of mindreading (or at least, who are incapable of mindreading of a sort that requires equivalent metarepresentational resources; see later). At any rate, on this view there must once have been such creatures. Moreover, if creatures of this sort were now discovered, then it would provide significant support for a first-person-based account of the emergence of metarepresentation. For the mindreadingbased account predicts, in contrast, that metarepresentational capacities should emerge in parallel for self and other (while perhaps allowing that other-directed metarepresentation might precede 1 equivalent forms of metacognition, if, for example, the animals aren't initially motivated to attend to their own mental states). This is because metacognition is held to result from (or at least to employ the conceptual and computational resources of) self-directed mindreading. The qualification about 'equivalent metarepresentational resources' is important. This is because it is widely agreed among developmental psychologists that mindreading admits of two distinct varieties, which emerge at different points in the course of infant development (Wellman 1990 ; Leslie 1994 ; Baron-Cohen 1995 ; Gopnik and Meltzoff 1997 ; . One is a form of goal/perception/knowledge-ignorance psychology that appears during the first year of life. Infants at this stage can represent the goals of other agents, as well as track what aspects of the world those agents do and do not have perceptual access to. As a result, infants at this age form appropriate expectations of agents who act in states of knowledge or ignorance respectively. But at this stage (generally referred to as 'Stage 1'), infants are incapable of representing the false belief of another agent, or of forming expectations based on how things appear to the other agent. These latter capacities only emerge toward the end of the fourth year of life (in language-based tasks), or by the middle of the second year of life (when non-verbal measures of competence are employed). Moreover, it is widely believed that the difference between Stage 1 and Stage 2 mindreading is one of domain-specific conceptual and/or computational competence , rather than resulting merely from performance factors. For it is thought that the capacity to pass Stage 2 tasks depends on an appreciation that mental representations can be incongruent with reality (as in a false belief), as opposed to merely omitting an aspect of reality (as happens in ignorance). 3 There is now evidence of Stage 1 mindreading capacities in non-human animals, not only among other primates such as chimpanzees and rhesus macaques (Hare et al. 2000 (Hare et al. , 2001 (Hare et al. , 2006 Flombaum and Santos 2005 ; Melis et al. 2006 ; Santos et al. 2006 ; Buttelmann et al. 2007 Buttelmann et al. , 2009a , but also among canids (dogs and wolves; Hare and Tomasello 2005 ; Hare 2007 ; Udell et al. 2008 ) , and corvids (jays, rooks, crows, and the like; Heinrich 2005 , 2006 ; Dally et al. 2006 Dally et al. , 2009 Bugnyar et al. 2007 ; Stulp et al. 2009 ). Note that all of these animals live in complex social groups, suggesting that the pressures of social living might have converged on the evolution of simple forms of mindreading capacity in widely separated species (Emery and Clayton 2004 ) , consistent with a version of the 'Machiavellian intelligence' hypothesis Whiten 1988 , 1997 ) .
Given the presence of Stage 1 mindreading in non-human primates, the finding that they may be capable of monitoring their own desires (Evans and Beran 2007 ) , their own perceptual access (Call and Carpenter 2001 ; Hampton et al. 2004 ; , and their own knowledge and ignorance (Hampton 2001 (Hampton , 2005 , fails to adjudicate in our dispute. For these findings are consistent with both self-directed-mindreading and first-person-based accounts. 4 3 It may yet turn out that this assumption is mistaken. Rather than reflecting differences in mindreading competence, the differences in performance might turn out to result from the differing executive demands of Stage 1 and Stage 2 tasks (Carruthers, forthcoming) . If so, then the failures of non-human primates on Stage 2 tasks might likewise result from problems of executive function. This would mean that the metacognitive data are incapable of adjudicating in the dispute between first-person-based and mindreadingbased accounts of the evolution of metarepresentation. For there would then be no reason to think that non-human primates are capable of forms of metacognition that outstrip their capacities for mindreading, even if they employ Stage 2 metarepresentational capacities in metacognitive tasks. 4 In fact we have doubts about the strength of some of this evidence. In particular, success in the memory monitoring experiments conducted by Hampton ( 2001 ) In contrast, the current consensus among comparative researchers is that no primate species other than humans is capable of 'Stage 2' mindreading, which would include a capacity to attribute false beliefs to other agents. For all tests of such abilities have proved negative, even when conducted in competitive situations, and even when paired with knowledge-ignorance tasks that the animals pass (Hare et al. 2001 ; O'Connell and Dunbar 2003 ; Kaminski et al. 2008 ; ). So if other primates can attribute such states to themselves, then this would present an anomaly for a mindreading-based account, while providing corresponding support for a firstperson-based view.
While there is no data of quite this kind in the literature, a substantial body of work on uncertainty monitoring aims to show that members of many primate species are capable of monitoring their own states of certainty and uncertainty, and of choosing adaptively as a result. This might be taken to demonstrate that these animals are capable of Stage 2 metacognition, suggesting that they possess the concept of false belief, at least, and can apply it in the first person. For one might think that mastery of the concept of uncertainty requires a capacity to understand that one's beliefs are potentially false. Whether or not this is so will be discussed in the next section.
Uncertainty and feelings of uncertainty
Uncertainty, like certainty, is fundamentally a cognitive state, not an emotional one. To be certain of something is to have a high degree of belief that it is the case. (This might be realized in the form of an especially strong signal produced by a classifier mechanism, for example, or an especially strong memory trace.) To be uncertain of something is to have a low degree of belief that it is so (perhaps realized in a weak signal from a classifier mechanism, or a weak memory trace). However, each of these states can also give rise to distinctive emotional feelings of confidence or uncertainty. Moreover, each will have other cognitive and behavioural effects as well, including fluent cognitive processing (in the case of certainty) and disfluency (in the case of uncertainty). 5 These further consequences of uncertainty will be used to undergird our alternative (nonmetarepresentational) explanations of the uncertainty-monitoring data in the next section.
If animals self-monitor and metarepresent themselves as uncertain of something, then they must be representing that they have a low degree of belief in it. This will require that they possess Stage 2 metarepresentational resources. For it cannot be sufficient to represent that one is certain of something to represent that one knows it (utilizing one of the concepts from Stage 1), and nor can it be sufficient to represent uncertainty to think that one is ignorant. This is because neither knowledge nor ignorance admit of degrees, and nor do they imply some level of incongruency with the world, as do degrees of belief. (Recall that a capacity to represent that a mental state is incongruous with the world is thought to be the hallmark of Stage 2 metarepresentation.) Moreover, in principle the metarepresentational states involved could be based on self-monitoring that is direct (detecting or introspecting a judgement with a low degree of belief) or indirect (detecting and classifying sensory or behavioural cues of the underlying state of uncertainty). Since no one in the human metacognition literature thinks that monitoring is direct, we propose to dismiss this possibility in respect of animals also (Koriat 2000 ; Dunlosky and Metcalfe 2009 ).
In fact it should be stressed that there is general agreement among researchers that human metacognitive judgements are cue based (Dunlosky and Metcalfe 2009 ). Judgements about way if a memory is present, and to act in another if it is not. But in neither case does it need to entertain a metarepresentation of memory. See Carruthers ( 2008 ) . 5 Cognitive fluency is the ease with which information is processed in the mind, and is signalled by such factors as the speed with which a decision is reached or an item is recognized. whether one has learned something or whether one knows something are grounded in sensorilyaccessible and affective cues, such as the ease with which the item in question is processed or the feeling of familiarity induced by its presentation. For although Hart ( 1965 ) once proposed a sort of direct-access model in order to explain feelings of knowing, his account has attracted very little empirical or theoretical support since then (Koriat 2000 ) . We should therefore expect that animals, too, will need to base their judgements on indirect cues -perhaps their own disfluency, or perhaps their own feelings of uncertainty.
Since humans in uncertainty-monitoring experiments must base their reports of their uncertainty on sensorily-accessible cues of some sort, it is reasonable to assume that the same, or something similar, is true of non-human primates. So it will be important to know how feelings of uncertainty should be characterized, as well as what other similar cues might be in the offing. What we can say with confidence is that often the feelings in question are negatively-valenced states accompanied by a degree of arousal that is proportional to what is at stake. Feeling uncertain can feel bad (to a greater or lesser degree), and it can also be agitating when concerned with important matters. 6 Feelings of uncertainty are caused by underlying states of uncertainty (that is, low degrees of belief). It is a separate question, however, what the negative valence component of the feeling is directed toward. What is it that one feels bad about, when one feels uncertain? What situation or state of affairs is it that seems bad as a result of negative valence, in the way that fear makes the threatening object seem bad and anger makes the causes of damage to oneself or to one's own seem bad? One possibility would implicate metarepresentation in the very feeling of uncertainty itself, utilizing metarepresentational resources. It may be that what strikes one as bad is that one has a low degree of belief. On this account, a judgement to the effect that one has a low degree of belief would be built into (or at least accompany) the feelings in question, providing the intended object or target of those feelings.
What we propose, however, is that feelings of uncertainty (in both humans and animals) are more plausibly seen as directed at the world (in particular, at the primary options for action that are open to one), rather than at one's own mental states. Consider what happens when people engage in the Iowa Gambling Task, for example (Bechara et al. 1994 ) . Subjects are required to select from four decks of cards with different probabilities of winning or losing. Two of the decks produce steady gains in the long-run (while sometimes issuing in big losses), while two produce long-term losses (and yet sometimes issue in big gains). After a while subjects begin to make most of their selections from the 'good' decks, but before they are capable of explicit recognition that those decks are better (let alone capable of articulating why they are better). Presumably, as a result of previous learning, the good decks are unconsciously appraised as more likely to issue in gains. As a result, the thought of selecting from those decks is positively valenced, making those options seem better. But in addition, some minor degree of arousal is also present, since subjects display an increased galvanic skin response when reaching toward one of the bad decks. 7 6 Note that we are not claiming that there is a unique introspectively-accessible feeling that is distinctive of states of uncertainty. Nor do we think that affective changes are always consciously experienced. All we need to be committed to for present purposes is that there will generally be some degree of affective change accompanying states of uncertainty, whether consciously experienced or not, and that these can exert an influence on subsequent behaviour.
7 Amiez et al. ( 2003 ) used a decision-making task equivalent to the Iowa Gambling Task with macaques, but found that the galvanic skin response occurred after the animals had made their selection, seemingly in anticipation of a reward. Quite how galvanic skin responses in uncertainty tasks like these are supposed to support Bechara and colleagues' own 'somatic marker' account of affective decision-making is a We should stress that in cases of this sort the affective changes can be quite minor, and may pass unnoticed by the subject. Yet still the good options seem good and the bad options seem bad, with effects on behaviour that can be quite significant. Certainly in humans, minor forms of affective priming can have large behavioural consequences. For example, Winkielman et al. ( 2005 ) used briefly presented, backward-masked, happy and angry faces (which were never consciously perceived) before subjects sampled a novel beverage. Thirsty subjects primed with positive affect drank twice as much of the beverage as those primed with negative affect, and in another condition, they offered to pay twice as much for a can of the drink having taken just a sip. Yet these unconscious primes had no discernable effects on the subjects' mood.
In fact we think that uncertainty-based decision-making may be best understood as of-a-piece with affectively-based decision-making generally, of the sort characterized by Damasio ( 1994 ) , Gilbert and Wilson ( 2007 ) , and many others. On this kind of account one runs the instructions for a motor action offline, using the efference copy to generate a forward model of its outcome (as described in the first section). When attended to, this is globally broadcast as an imagistic representation of the action, which one's evaluative and emotional systems receive and respond to. The result is some degree of positive or negative affect, which provides the motivation to execute the action or to seek an alternative means to the goal (or to pursue an alternative goal). On this kind of account feelings of uncertainty would consist of negatively valenced affect that is caused by the thought of an otherwise-attractive action, and that is directed toward the situation represented in the content of that thought. (It is the performance of the action that seems bad as a result, not the fact that one is thinking about it.)
There is some reason to believe that members of other primate species might be capable of such processes of mental rehearsal and affective evaluation, underlying their limited capacity for advance planning (Sanz et al. 2004 ; Mulcahy and Call 2006 ) , and perhaps also explaining instances of 'insight' behaviour (see Carruthers 2006 , for discussion). And indeed, a similar capacity might be more widespread still. Think of the cat that crouches down as if to leap, literally rehearsing (the first stages of) a difficult leap from a roof to a nearby tree. Presumably the act of representing the action issues in appraisals of likely success, resulting either in positive affect (felt confidence) directed at the intended leap, or in negative affect (felt uncertainty), leading the cat to seek other solutions.
In this section we have distinguished uncertainty from the cognitive and affective consequences of uncertainty, and we have pointed out that animals, like humans, will need to rely on indirect cues of uncertainty, even if they do metarepresent such states. We have also suggested that the valence component of feelings of uncertainty is directed at the primary response options, rather than at one's own mental states. While humans engage in many forms of metacognitive decisionmaking, requiring them to metarepresent their own mental states and processes, basic forms of affectively-based decision-making are not metarepresentational in humans. When we represent and respond affectively to alternative courses of action, no metarepresentations need be involved. As a result, in the following section we will suggest that the uncertainty-monitoring data may be explained without ascribing metarepresentational capacities of any sort to the animals involved. 8 complicated matter, however (Dunn et al. 2006 ). So it is far from clear that this result undermines their hypothesis. But in any case our view is not committed to the details of this particular theory of the manner in which affective cues influence decision-making. Indeed, our primary focus is on the valence component of affect, rather than on bodily arousal. 8 This will mean that even if the evidence suggesting that non-human primates are capable of Stage 1 forms of mindreading proves to be unsound, it will still be the case that the uncertainty-monitoring data fail to 
Affective explanations of the evidence
The present section will discuss three distinct non-metarepresentational explanations of the uncertainty-monitoring data from non-human primates. The first is unsatisfying on its own. But each of the others provides a viable alternative to a metarepresentational account. We will focus especially on a valence-based theory that builds on some of the ideas from the previous section.
Degrees of belief
One form of non-metarepresentational explanation is proposed by Carruthers ( 2008 ) , who appeals to degrees of belief and desire, together with ordinary practical reasoning, to show how the uncertainty-monitoring data can be explained. While this account may not be incorrect, it strikes us as incomplete. This is because it is purely cognitive in nature, and fails to provide for the emotional character of uncertainty. 9 Since humans in such experiments report not only that they are uncertain (in the sense of having low degrees of belief) but that they feel uncertain (and indeed, since a judgement that one is uncertain must be grounded in indirect cues such as feelings of uncertainty), it seems inadvisable to omit an affective component from the explanation. For the results of uncertainty monitoring experiments with humans can parallel the animal uncertainty-monitoring data quite closely (Smith et al. 2003 (Smith et al. , 2008 Smith 2005 ) . Accordingly, two further accounts will be outlined here. Each appeals to the consequences of states of uncertainty, while differing from one another in the factors that are utilized. We should emphasize, however, that these accounts are consistent with one another. Each might apply in different kinds of case, or they might combine together in the same cases.
Affective consequences as cues
One possibility is that the animals in question have learned to use some aspect of their own feelings of uncertainty as a cue , but without at any time metarepresenting that they are uncertain (i.e. without categorizing their affective experience as a feeling of uncertainty), or thinking that their judgements or memories are likely to be false. In effect, they may be a following a rule like, 'When in a state of that sort [uncertainty] , opt out and do something different', which would only require possession of an indexical, non-mental, concept. This can explain why the animals are more likely to press the opt-out key in psychophysically difficult cases, and it can also explain how the animals are able to generalize the use of the opt-out key when presented with it in the context of a newly learned discrimination task (Son and Kornell 2005 ; Kornell et al. 2007 ). But neither the feeling itself, nor the indexical concept used to identify it, need involve metarepresentation. Rather, just as humans are apt to do (Koriat 2000 ) , the animals might utilize their own disfluency or the bodily feelings associated with uncertainty as cues when confronted with difficult cases. We know from the human case that affective states provide experiential cues for metacognitive deliberation (Koriat 2000 ; Koriat et al. 2006 Koriat et al. , 2008 . For example, differences in affective states during learning or retrieving information are used as cues that reflect the underlying processing dynamics or processing fluency. In the case of information that is easy to process, greater fluency results, causing positive affect (Winkielman and Cacioppo 2001 ) . The extent to which people show confidence in automatic, intuitive, judgements is heavily dependent on processing fluency. This is true, for example, in low-difficulty recognition tasks, where selection can be based primarily on support first-person-based views. For uncertainty-monitoring behaviour arguably fails to involve metarepresentations of any sort (whether Stage 1 or Stage 2). 9 Emotions might, however, be incorporated into the account as a way of implementing the so-called 'gating mechanism' appealed to. Mandler 1980 ) , and also in implicit learning tasks (Gordon and Holyoak 1983 ) . 10 Disfluent processing, by contrast, has been suggested to play a role in initiating a transition from more automatic processing to more executively-controlled explicit processing (Alter et al. 2007 ). This role for disfluency has been interpreted as a cue for metacognitive processing, but being sensitive to disfluency need not presuppose any capacity for metarepresentation. For what the experiment by Alter and colleagues shows is that disfluent processing causes changes in attention , issuing in different forms of cognitive control. And these changes in attention to the task might drive the selection of different reasoning strategies in the absence of metacognitive processing. Alternatively, disfluent processing might cause subjects to attend to their own increased arousal, for example, which is taken as a cue to reason differently. 11 Note that although this sort of account need not involve metarepresentation, it does rely on self-directed forms of attention. For the animals will attend to, and notice, something about themselves (such as their own bodily feelings) in order to learn the cue-based rule in question. So it can appropriately be described as a form of uncertainty monitoring , even if the monitoring involved is not metarepresentational. The remaining form of affect-based explanation, in contrast, is entirely outward-looking or world-directed in character, while likewise finding a basis in what is known about human decision-making.
Directed valence
Suppose that animals, like humans, integrate probabilistic information with intended goal outcomes to issue in appraisals of the likelihood of success of the options available to them in a decision-making context. In that case, when an animal has a low degree of belief in something (that the pattern on the screen is dense rather than sparse, or that it has just touched the longest of the lines on the screen, for example), then actions that depend upon the truth of that belief will be appraised as unlikely to succeed. 12 Consequently the animal will experience some degree of anxiety when it contemplates pressing the 'dense' key or the 'gamble' option (albeit quite minor, since the stakes are so low). With negative valence directed at the action in question, it will to that extent seem bad or aversive. In such circumstances the primary response options will be seen in a mixed evaluative light. On the one hand they will seem good, since they hold out the possibility of a significant reward; but on the other hand they will seem bad, since they are appraised as unlikely to succeed. The opt-out response, in contrast, will be seen as an unopposed weak positive, since it either advances the animal to a new trial without a time-out or issues in a guaranteed less favoured reward. It is not surprising, then, that the animals should press the opt-out key more often in such circumstances.
As we noted earlier, this explanation coheres well with what is known about the decisionmaking processes employed by humans. When humans are confronted with choices they will generally rehearse the actions involved in implementing those choices. These representations, when taken as input by the individual's affective mechanisms, will result in some degree of positive or negative affect directed at the option in question. This makes that option seem either good 10 Here we presuppose a processing-fluency view of feelings of familiarity, in the manner of Jacoby ( 1991 ).
11 Note that neither interoception nor proprioception, of the sort that might underlie awareness of arousal, are metarepresentational forms of awareness (although in a loose sense they can be described as 'introspective'). Rather, they issue in awareness of properties of the body.
12 See Balci et al. ( 2009 ) for evidence that mice, too, are capable of making swift and accurate assessments of risk. See also Gallistel et al. ( 2001 ) for evidence that rats are excellent at tracking random changes in the probability of reward. 1 or bad (attractive or aversive), in many cases issuing in a decision (unless the subject opts to engage in more explicit reflection of some sort). 13 Smith ( 2005 ) makes much of the fact that humans in uncertainty-monitoring experiments have response profiles that closely parallel those of the animals (see also Smith et al. 2008 ) . Since the humans report that they opt out in conditions of uncertainty because they are aware of being uncertain, this is said to give us reason to attribute similar awareness to the animals. But it does not. For basic forms of decision-making in humans don't employ metarepresentational awareness, as we have seen. So both humans and animals will experience negatively valenced forms of anxiety directed toward the primary response options, resulting from an appraisal of low likelihood of success. (The latter in turn is grounded in the low degree of belief that attaches to the categorization or judgement underlying the required discrimination.) This will make those options appear bad or mildly aversive. Such perceptions, when strong enough, will leave the optout option as the better-seeming alternative. All of this is entirely non-metarepresentational, as we have noted. But humans, with their highly-developed mindreading capacities, will categorize the state they are in as a feeling of uncertainty, either automatically or when asked to explain their choice. This categorization might play no role, however, in their basic decision-making behaviour (unless it is first articulated and treated as a commitment). Indeed, their metacognizing might be largely post hoc.
What we suggest, then, is that in humans both uncertainty and its influence on behaviour should be dissociable from metarepresentational awareness of uncertainty. To the best of our knowledge this has not been directly tested. But we predict that subjects who have difficulties with mindreading (including those suffering from autism or schizophrenia) might show capacities to make adaptive use of the opt-out key in uncertainty-responding experiments that are spared in comparison with their capacity to identify themselves as uncertain. For example, in one condition subjects might perform the task without making any explicit metacognitive judgements, whereas in another they might be required to make such a judgement before deciding whether or not to opt out. Our prediction is that performance in the former condition should be significantly better than performance in the latter, in these populations.
Further consequences of the accounts
Notice that both of the affect-based explanations mooted here make significant executive demands on the animals in question. In order for feelings of uncertainty to be used as cues to opt out, they have to be attended to. And in order for one to feel anxious at the thought of taking a particular action, that action has to be mentally rehearsed. We should predict, then, that the animals are unlikely to make adaptive use of opt-out behaviour in cases where they are required to execute some concurrent task. Note that this prediction is not made by the degrees-of-belief account alone (independent of any role for epistemic emotions). However, it is also a prediction of the metarepresentational account. So the finding that use of the opt-out response diminishes when animals are required to engage in an ancillary task (Smith 2011 ) , does nothing to support a metarepresentational account of uncertainty monitoring over its affect-based competitors.
Moreover, each of the affect-based accounts makes the following empirical prediction. Mood manipulations that are effective in reducing anxiety, or drugs that produce such an outcome, should significantly reduce the extent to which animals opt out in conditions of uncertainty. 13 Note that this account deviates slightly from that provided by Damasio ( 1994 ) , who places more emphasis on the arousal and other bodily components of affect, rather than on the valence component as we do here. For discussion and defence, see Carruthers ( 2011 In contrast, the degrees-of-belief account fails to make any such prediction. For it is purely cognitive in nature. Moreover, any metacognitive account that is cast in purely cognitive terms (merely maintaining that the animals are aware of their uncertainty, for example) will likewise fail to make such a prediction. However, mood manipulations, even if successful, would not necessarily support an affect-based account of uncertainty-monitoring behaviour over a metarepresentational one. For metacognitive theorists can presumably claim that what is represented is an emotional state of uncertainty, and in that case manipulations that reduce anxiety will have the effect of making it harder to monitor and metarepresent the relevant state. None of the tests that have been employed to date are capable of discriminating between metarepresentational and non-metarepresentational explanations of uncertainty-monitoring behaviour. So we are forced to fall back on indirect reasons that might favour one or other kind of explanation, of the sort that have been in play up to now. Some further considerations of this kind will form the topic of the next section. Smith ( 2005 ) and others have argued that differences in uncertainty-monitoring behaviour between species support a metarepresentational account. In this section we challenge this interpretation, while also arguing that individual differences in such behaviour among humans may be problematic for first-person-based accounts to accommodate.
Species differences and individual variation

Species differences
We agree that differences in uncertainty monitoring behaviour across species favour a metarepresentational account over an associative learning competitor, since the species that fail in these tasks (rats and pigeons) excel at such learning (Smith 2005 ; Smith et al. 2009 ). But they don't support a metarepresentational account over either of the affectively-based proposals discussed earlier in the 'Affective explanations of the evidence' section. This is because there may be species differences in the extent to which anxiety is created in foraging situations, or differences in the extent to which members of a given species pay attention to or notice their own bodily feelings, or differences in capacities to engage in mental rehearsal of action. None of these differences is yet confirmed. But until they are ruled out, we have no positive reason to believe that the difference between the species is a metarepresentational one.
It might be claimed that differences in uncertainty-monitoring behaviour among distinct species of monkey provide a greater challenge for non-metarepresentational accounts cf. Basile et al. 2009 ). Capuchin monkeys, in particular, rarely if ever make use of the optout response, even after numerous trials, and even under conditions designed to bias the monkeys toward using the opt-out response. Macaque monkeys, in contrast, show response profiles that closely parallel those of humans. It should be obvious from the previous discussion, however, that there are multiple types of resource that could potentially be used to explain these differences without appealing to metarepresentational capacities, and some of these explanations are independently plausible. 14 14 We note that Beran et al. ( 2009 ) themselves offer accounts of the failure of capuchins in these tasks that don't seem to depend on an absence of metarepresentational capacities. They suggest, for example, that capuchins may lack the ability to appreciate the abstract and indirect benefit of selecting the uncertainty response to maximize reward, leading them to focus on the primary, directly rewarding, options. If this is transposed into a positive account of macaques' success in these tasks, then the account is no longer a metacognitive one. For appreciating an indirect benefit need not require metarepresentation. It is possible that the two species differ in the extent to which they are apt to experience anxiety in foraging situations. In particular, if capuchins feel little or no anxiety when confronted with a difficult discrimination task to gain a food reward, then they will not be motivated to use the optout key. If macaques are more like humans in this respect, however, then the primary response options will be experienced as aversive in cases of difficult discrimination, making it more likely that the animals will use the opt-out response. Alternatively, capuchins might experience anxiety, but not know what to do with it (i.e. what control operation to adopt). (Compare people who are used to dealing with high degrees of anxiety and those who are not.) These suggestions could be motivated by the following ecological facts.
Capuchins are arboreal, living locally in forest environments that provide ample sources of fruits, nuts, leaves, and insects that constitute their primary diet. Although they experience food competition within groups, adults are known to share food with unrelated infants, and adults will often share food with one another (De Waal 2000 ) . Macaques, in contrast, are often semi-nomadic with broad ranges, and have colonized a wide set of ecologies, with the largest distribution of any non-human primate genus (Fleagle 1998 ) . Illustrating their flexibility in adapting to new environments, 'weed' macaques (such as the rhesus macaque) have been able to thrive in human environments (Richard et al. 1989 ). Although they, too, are omnivorous, they are subject to intense food competition within groups (Sterck and Steenbeek 1997 ) . It would not be surprising, then, that they might have become adapted to experience and deal with anxiety in difficult foraging situations, since they face far more uncertainties when foraging than do capuchins. Smith ( 2005 ) also notes that both humans and the other primates in these experiments display similar ranges of individual difference. Some people, and some animals, never make use of the opt-out key, and confine themselves to the primary response options, whereas others opt out adaptively in circumstances where they are likely to make (or to have made) a mistake. It is unclear why this should be thought to support a metarepresentational account, however. (Indeed, we will suggest in a moment that it may cause problems for that account.) In any case, each of the two affect-based theories is capable of explaining this fact.
Individual differences
In the first place, it is well known that there are chronic differences among people in the extent to which they pay attention to the bodily -arousal -component of their emotional states (Barrett 1998 ; Gasper and Clore 2000 ; Barrett et al. 2004 ) , and one might expect the same to be true of other primates. Such individuals are unlikely to notice the manifestations of their own state of uncertainty, and so will be less likely to learn to use them as cues to opt out. It is also well known that there are chronic differences between people (and presumably other primates) in the extent to which they become anxious in everyday situations. Those who aren't easily made anxious will fail to see the primary response options as bad or aversive, and so will lack any motivation to use the opt-out response, whereas those who are more easily made anxious will opt out more often.
In contrast, while all views might predict that there will be individual differences in the extent to which people make use of the opt-out option, the fact that some people (and animals) almost never employ it is harder for a metacognitive theorist to accommodate. How hard it is will be a function of the proportion of subjects who never opt out. If such people are rare, then they might be considered the tail-ends of a normal distribution. But if they are numerous, and the normal distribution curve is not very steep, then this will be more problematic. For recall that the conceptual and inferential resources necessary to monitor one's own mental states are claimed to have been selected for precisely because of the adaptive advantages that they yield in situations like this. It would therefore be puzzling if there should turn out to be many individuals who nevertheless fail to make use of those resources. (It would much as if we found a significant proportion of people who never make use of episodic memory.) For there is surely just as much need for people to monitor uncertainty as there ever was in our evolutionary past. If metarepresentional resources evolved, in part, to enable animals to monitor their own uncertainty and respond adaptively, then one would expect that those resources would be regularly and reliably employed by the vast majority of normal individuals. The affect-based accounts, in contrast, can appeal to widespread individual differences that are already known to exist. It seems, then, that in the absence of a direct experimental test, there are no indirect reasons to favour a metarepresentational account of the uncertainty-monitoring data over its affect-based competitors; indeed, there are some reasons to prefer the latter. 15 
Conclusion
We conclude that existing uncertainty-monitoring experiments with non-human primates fail to discriminate between a metacognitive (metarepresentational) account and those that rely on non-metarepresentational uses of feelings of uncertainty. Until experiments that might tease apart these differing explanations have been done, a metarepresentational account of the uncertainty-monitoring data is unsupported. As a result, while we have good reason to think that these animals are capable of taking executively controlled decisions in many ways like our own, we presently have no reason to prefer a first-person-based account of the evolutionary emergence of metacognition over its mindreading-based competitor. 
